YARA · Mandiant red team tool countermeasures
FIREEYE_RT_Dropper_HTA_Wildchild_1
This rule looks for strings present in unobfuscated HTAs generated by the WildChild builder.
- Author
- FireEye
- Date
- 2020-12-08
- Modified
- 2020-12-09
- Score / Quality
- 75 / 75
What this rule detects
This rule looks for strings present in unobfuscated HTAs generated by the WildChild builder.
It defines 10 patterns (10 text, 0 hex, 0 regex).
YARA-X says: warning[unintended_pattern_in_set]: pattern `$script_header` may be unintendedly or redundantly included in pattern set `$s*`
Summary generated from the rule's metadata and condition.
Rule source
rule FIREEYE_RT_Dropper_HTA_Wildchild_1 : FILE
{
meta:
= "This rule looks for strings present in unobfuscated HTAs generated by the WildChild builder."
= "FireEye"
= "f570baa5-7d58-5a0a-b713-769e62076f76"
= "2020-12-08"
= "2020-12-09"
= "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/"
= "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures//blob/3561b71724dbfa3e2bb78106aaa2d7f8b892c43b/rules/WILDCHILD/production/yara/Dropper_HTA_WildChild_1.yar#L4-L24"
= "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures//blob/3561b71724dbfa3e2bb78106aaa2d7f8b892c43b/LICENSE.txt"
= "3e61ca5057633459e96897f79970a46d"
= "60c1d53b8a43b9b7518f3260a4d61c6806641ee894a2a331a3a0a2ea0aff9d99"
= 75
= 75
= "FILE"
= 5
strings:
$s1 = "processpath" ascii wide
$s2 = "v4.0.30319" ascii wide
$s3 = "v2.0.50727" ascii wide
$s4 = "COMPLUS_Version" ascii wide
$s5 = "FromBase64Transform" ascii wide
$s6 = "MemoryStream" ascii wide
$s7 = "entry_class" ascii wide
$s8 = "DynamicInvoke" ascii wide
$s9 = "Sendoff" ascii wide
$script_header = "<script language=" ascii wide
condition:
$script_header at 0 and all of ( $s* )
}
Strings (10 patterns)
| Identifier | Type | Value | Modifiers |
|---|---|---|---|
| $s1 | text | "processpath" | ascii wide |
| $s2 | text | "v4.0.30319" | ascii wide |
| $s3 | text | "v2.0.50727" | ascii wide |
| $s4 | text | "COMPLUS_Version" | ascii wide |
| $s5 | text | "FromBase64Transform" | ascii wide |
| $s6 | text | "MemoryStream" | ascii wide |
| $s7 | text | "entry_class" | ascii wide |
| $s8 | text | "DynamicInvoke" | ascii wide |
| $s9 | text | "Sendoff" | ascii wide |
| $script_header | text | "<script language=" | ascii wide |
Condition
$script_header at 0 and all of ( $s* )In plain words (Heuristic)
- All patterns in ( $s* ) must match.
- Pattern $script_header must be found at offset 0.
Test this rule in your browser
Drop a file to scan it with this rule using YARA-X compiled to WebAssembly. Nothing is uploaded.
Sample hashes
Hashes of samples the author lists in the rule's meta (look them up in your threat-intelligence platform).
- 3e61ca5057633459e96897f79970a46d
Licence & attribution
Author: FireEye
Source repository: Mandiant red team tool countermeasures @ 3561b71724
Licence: BSD 2-Clause License (repository licence)
Copyright notice: Copyright (c) 2023, MANDIANT
Mirrored via YARA Forge 20260927, which prefixes rule names with the source and adds normalised meta fields.
Rule id: f570baa5-7d58-5a0a-b713-769e62076f76
Metadata
| rev | 5 |
|---|
Tags:FILE
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