YARA · BlackBerry Research & Intelligence (via Open-Source-YARA-rules)
BLACKBERRY_Mal_Infostealer_MSI_EXE_Jupyter_Certificate
Detects Jupter by certificate
- Auteur
- BlackBerry Threat Research Team
- Date
- 2021-11-04
- Modifiée
- 2022-07-06
- Score / Qualité
- 75 / 83
Ce que détecte cette règle
Detects Jupter by certificate
Cibles : PE Windows.
Elle définit 16 motifs (12 texte, 1 hex, 3 regex).
Résumé généré à partir des métadonnées et de la condition de la règle.
Source de la règle
rule BLACKBERRY_Mal_Infostealer_MSI_EXE_Jupyter_Certificate : FILE
{
meta:
= "Detects Jupter by certificate"
= "BlackBerry Threat Research Team"
= "837fdc85-d5ac-560b-bc49-6e34eb216e93"
= "2021-11-04"
= "2022-07-06"
= "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/01/threat-thursday-jupyter-infostealer-is-a-master-of-disguise"
= "https://github.com/mikesxrs/Open-Source-YARA-rules/blob/ec0056f767db98bf6d5fd63877ad51fb54d350e9/Blackberry/Mal_Infostealer_MSI_EXE_Jupyter_Certificate.yar#L1-L43"
= "N/A"
= "5524f227e4c0090b923d7966223806dd384458178083b752ebd9e0981b3fba52"
= 75
= 83
= "FILE"
= "This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team"
strings:
$msi = { D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1 }
$a1 = "EMCO MSI Package Builder"
$b1 = "powershell-ExecutionPolicy bypass -command \"iex([\\[]IO.File[\\]]::ReadAllText('[CurrentUserProfileFolder]" nocase
$b2 = "powershell-ep bypass -file \"[AppDataFolder]" nocase
$b3 = /powershell-ep bypass -windowstyle hidden -command \"\$xp=\'\[AppDataFolder\].{0,256}\.{0,256}\'/ nocase
$b4 = /powershell-ep bypass -windowstyle hidden -command \"\$p=\'\[AppDataFolder\].{0,256}\.{0,256}\'/ nocase
$b5 = /powershell-ExecutionPolicy bypass -command \"iex\(\[\\\[\]IO.File\[\\\]\]::ReadAllText\(\'\[CurrentUserProfileFolder\].{1,256}\..{1,256}\'\)\)/ nocase
$c1 = "OOO ENDI"
$c2 = "OOO MVS"
$c3 = "OOO LEVELAP"
$c4 = "Soto Manufacturing SRL"
$c5 = "Decapolis Consulting Inc."
$f1 = "SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority RSA R2"
$f2 = "SSL.com EV Code Signing Intermediate CA RSA R3"
$f3 = "DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1"
$f4 = "DigiCert Trusted Root G40"
condition:
($msi at 0 or uint16( 0 ) == 0x5a4d ) and all of ( $a* ) and 1 of ( $b* ) and 1 of ( $c* ) and 2 of ( $f* )
}
Chaînes (16 motifs)
| Identifiant | Type | Valeur | Modificateurs |
|---|---|---|---|
| $msi | hex | { D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1 } | |
| $a1 | texte | "EMCO MSI Package Builder" | |
| $b1 | texte | "powershell-ExecutionPolicy bypass -command \"iex([\\[]IO.File[\\]]::ReadAllText('[CurrentUserProfileFolder]" | nocase |
| $b2 | texte | "powershell-ep bypass -file \"[AppDataFolder]" | nocase |
| $b3 | regex | /powershell-ep bypass -windowstyle hidden -command \"\$xp=\'\[AppDataFolder\].{0,256}\.{0,256}\'/ | nocase |
| $b4 | regex | /powershell-ep bypass -windowstyle hidden -command \"\$p=\'\[AppDataFolder\].{0,256}\.{0,256}\'/ | nocase |
| $b5 | regex | /powershell-ExecutionPolicy bypass -command \"iex\(\[\\\[\]IO.File\[\\\]\]::ReadAllText\(\'\[CurrentUserProfileFolder\].{1,256}\..{1,256}\'\)\)/ | nocase |
| $c1 | texte | "OOO ENDI" | |
| $c2 | texte | "OOO MVS" | |
| $c3 | texte | "OOO LEVELAP" | |
| $c4 | texte | "Soto Manufacturing SRL" | |
| $c5 | texte | "Decapolis Consulting Inc." | |
| $f1 | texte | "SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority RSA R2" | |
| $f2 | texte | "SSL.com EV Code Signing Intermediate CA RSA R3" | |
| $f3 | texte | "DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1" | |
| $f4 | texte | "DigiCert Trusted Root G40" |
Condition
($msi at 0 or uint16( 0 ) == 0x5a4d ) and all of ( $a* ) and 1 of ( $b* ) and 1 of ( $c* ) and 2 of ( $f* )En clair (Heuristique)
- Le fichier doit commencer par « MZ » — un exécutable Windows (PE).
- Tous les motifs de ( $a* ) doivent être trouvés.
- Au moins 1 motifs de ( $b* ) doivent être trouvés.
- Au moins 1 motifs de ( $c* ) doivent être trouvés.
- Au moins 2 motifs de ( $f* ) doivent être trouvés.
- Le motif $msi doit se trouver à l’offset 0.
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Licence et attribution
Auteur : BlackBerry Threat Research Team
Dépôt source : BlackBerry Research & Intelligence (via Open-Source-YARA-rules) @ ec0056f767
Licence : Apache License 2.0 (indiquée dans les métadonnées de la règle)
“This Yara rule is provided under the Apache License 2.0 (https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license and ensure originator credit in any derivative to The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team”
Reprise via YARA Forge 20260927, qui préfixe les noms de règles par la source et ajoute des champs meta normalisés.
Identifiant de règle: 837fdc85-d5ac-560b-bc49-6e34eb216e93
Tags:FILE
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