YARA · Mandiant red team tool countermeasures
FIREEYE_RT_Credtheft_MSIL_Titospecial_1
This rule looks for .NET PE files that have the strings of various method names in the TitoSpecial code.
- Autor
- FireEye
- Datum
- 2020-12-08
- Geändert
- 2020-12-09
- Score / Qualität
- 75 / 75
Was diese Regel erkennt
This rule looks for .NET PE files that have the strings of various method names in the TitoSpecial code.
Ziele: Windows-PE.
Sie definiert 13 Muster (13 Text, 0 Hex, 0 Regex).
Zusammenfassung aus den Metadaten und der Bedingung der Regel erzeugt.
Regelquelltext
rule FIREEYE_RT_Credtheft_MSIL_Titospecial_1 : FILE
{
meta:
= "This rule looks for .NET PE files that have the strings of various method names in the TitoSpecial code."
= "FireEye"
= "932bb013-03de-5cf7-89e9-b3232151d303"
= "2020-12-08"
= "2020-12-09"
= "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/"
= "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures//blob/3561b71724dbfa3e2bb78106aaa2d7f8b892c43b/rules/TITOSPECIAL/production/yara/CredTheft_MSIL_TitoSpecial_1.yar#L4-L27"
= "https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures//blob/3561b71724dbfa3e2bb78106aaa2d7f8b892c43b/LICENSE.txt"
= "4bf96a7040a683bd34c618431e571e26"
= "4ac9a5ede4aea5d73545b459eb635f87ce08ba521afa48b76d2cfa94f1379226"
= 75
= 75
= "FILE"
= 4
strings:
$str1 = "Minidump" ascii wide
$str2 = "dumpType" ascii wide
$str3 = "WriteProcessMemory" ascii wide
$str4 = "bInheritHandle" ascii wide
$str5 = "GetProcessById" ascii wide
$str6 = "SafeHandle" ascii wide
$str7 = "BeginInvoke" ascii wide
$str8 = "EndInvoke" ascii wide
$str9 = "ConsoleApplication1" ascii wide
$str10 = "getOSInfo" ascii wide
$str11 = "OpenProcess" ascii wide
$str12 = "LoadLibrary" ascii wide
$str13 = "GetProcAddress" ascii wide
condition:
( uint16( 0 ) == 0x5A4D and uint32( uint32( 0x3C ) ) == 0x00004550 ) and all of ( $str* )
}
Strings (13 Muster)
| Bezeichner | Typ | Wert | Modifikatoren |
|---|---|---|---|
| $str1 | Text | "Minidump" | ascii wide |
| $str2 | Text | "dumpType" | ascii wide |
| $str3 | Text | "WriteProcessMemory" | ascii wide |
| $str4 | Text | "bInheritHandle" | ascii wide |
| $str5 | Text | "GetProcessById" | ascii wide |
| $str6 | Text | "SafeHandle" | ascii wide |
| $str7 | Text | "BeginInvoke" | ascii wide |
| $str8 | Text | "EndInvoke" | ascii wide |
| $str9 | Text | "ConsoleApplication1" | ascii wide |
| $str10 | Text | "getOSInfo" | ascii wide |
| $str11 | Text | "OpenProcess" | ascii wide |
| $str12 | Text | "LoadLibrary" | ascii wide |
| $str13 | Text | "GetProcAddress" | ascii wide |
Bedingung
( uint16( 0 ) == 0x5A4D and uint32( uint32( 0x3C ) ) == 0x00004550 ) and all of ( $str* )In Worten (Heuristik)
- Die Datei muss mit „MZ“ beginnen — eine Windows-Programmdatei (PE).
- Alle Muster aus ( $str* ) müssen treffen.
Diese Regel im Browser testen
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Proben-Hashes
Hashes der Proben, die der Autor in den Metadaten der Regel nennt (in Ihrer Threat-Intelligence-Plattform nachschlagen).
- 4bf96a7040a683bd34c618431e571e26
Lizenz & Namensnennung
Autor: FireEye
Quell-Repository: Mandiant red team tool countermeasures @ 3561b71724
Lizenz: BSD 2-Clause License (Repository-Lizenz)
Copyright-Hinweis: Copyright (c) 2023, MANDIANT
Gespiegelt über YARA Forge 20260927, das Regelnamen mit der Quelle präfixiert und normalisierte Meta-Felder ergänzt.
Regel-ID: 932bb013-03de-5cf7-89e9-b3232151d303
Metadaten
| rev | 4 |
|---|
Tags:FILE
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